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Abstract 
Societies embarked on the fragile transition from war to peace face enormous economic, 
social, and political challenges. In attempting to support this transition, the international 
community often provides substantial amounts of external assistance. This aid can play 
an important and constructive role in meeting pressing social needs and building a 
durable peace, but it would be naïve to assume either that positive effects are the 
automatic result of good intentions or that donors are motivated entirely by the objective 
of peacebuilding. This paper reviews evidence on the impact of aid in “post-conflict” 
settings and offers suggestions for making aid more effective in supporting efforts to 
build a durable peace. Part I discusses how economic assistance and conditionalities can 
be realigned to better serve peacebuilding objectives. Part II considers the other side of 
the coin: how peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding assistance can better support 
economic recovery, in particular by helping to build state fiscal capacities. Finally, Part 
III examines the interests and incentive structures that shape the behavior of aid donors, 
suggesting that their actions can be part of the problem as well as part of the solution.  
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Introduction 
 
Wartorn societies embarked on the fragile transition from violent conflict to a durable 
peace face enormous economic, social, and political challenges. In attempting to support 
this transition, the international community often provides substantial amounts of 
external assistance. This assistance can play an important and constructive role in 
meeting pressing social needs and building a durable peace, but it would be naïve to 
assume either that positive effects are the automatic result of good intentions or that 
donors are motivated entirely by the objective of peacebuilding. This paper reviews 
evidence on the impact of aid in what are optimistically called “post-conflict” settings, 
and offers some thoughts as to how aid can more effectively support efforts to build a 
durable peace.  
 
The paper has three parts: 
 
Part I, “Aid for Peace,” examines the interaction between the twin objectives of building 
peace and fostering economic recovery. The two objectives are mutually supportive: 
without a successful transition from war to peace, economic recovery is unlikely or 
impossible; and without economic recovery, a successful war-to-peace transition is less 
probable. Yet it would be a mistake to infer from this complementarity that political 
efforts to implement peace accords and economic efforts to promote reconstruction and 
recovery can proceed along separate tracks, oblivious of each other and secure in the 
knowledge that each assists the other. Experience demonstrates that effective aid for 
peace requires that economic reconstruction and recovery efforts explicitly address the 
political imperatives of peacebuilding. At the same time, peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
efforts must explicitly address economic imperatives. The first part of the paper focuses 
on the first issue: how economic assistance can be tailored to the special challenges of 
war-to-peace transitions. In particular, I discuss how aid conditionalities can be realigned 
to better serve peacebuilding objectives. 
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Part II, “Building Fiscal Capacity,” considers the other side of the coin: how 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding assistance can better support economic recovery. In 
particular, I focus on measures to build the fiscal basis for a sustainable state – that is, 
capacities to mobilize domestic revenue, allocate resources through the budget, and 
manage public expenditure. All too often, members of the international community have 
regarded the building of fiscal capacities as a specialized “niche issue” that can be left to 
the international financial institutions (IFIs) – notably the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank – to address through technical assistance. This stance of benign 
neglect can have malign results, if external assistance “crowds out” domestic fiscal 
capacities rather than helping to build them. 
 
Part III, “Interrogating Donor Behavior,” examines the motives and modus operandi of 
external assistance actors in post-war countries. Donors often assume that ‘the problem’ 
is located entirely in the societies on the receiving end of their assistance, and that they 
themselves are intrinsically part of ‘the solution.’ Experience provides good reasons to 
question this comfortable assumption. The motives and priorities of donor governments 
are not always congruent with the objective of building peace, and the incentive 
structures within the aid agencies themselves are not always conducive to making aid an 
effective instrument for this purpose. Donor behavior can be part of the problem, too. 
 
Part I: Aid for Peace 
 
Official development assistance (ODA) generally comes with strings attached. 
Multilateral and bilateral donors use conditionality to advance a variety of goals, some 
noble, others less so. The conditions sometimes are spelled out in formal performance 
criteria, as in the economic policy targets in IMF loan agreements. Other times the 
conditions are communicated informally in the process known as ‘policy dialogue.’ 
Whether formal or informal, conditionality makes assistance contingent on actions by the 
recipient. Aid seldom is a blank check.  
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The objectives of conditionality typically do not include the prevention or resolution of 
violent conflict. The IMF and World Bank primarily use conditionality to pursue short-
term macroeconomic stabilization and longer-term structural adjustment. Bilateral donors 
often use conditionality for commercial purposes, as when aid is tied to purchases of 
goods and services from the donor country. They also may use it to advance geopolitical 
aims, as illustrated in the United States government’s efforts to enlist support for the war 
in Iraq.1 In addition, donors have also attempted, albeit rather sporadically, to use 
conditionality to promote political reforms under the rubric of ‘good governance.’ 
 
Such conditionalities may affect the likelihood of war or peace indirectly. Proponents of 
conventional macroeconomic conditionality sometimes claim, for example, that 
neoliberal policies serve the cause of peace by fostering economic growth. On the other 
hand, critics argue that these same policies not only often fail to promote growth, but also 
exacerbate income disparities and social tensions (Pastor and Conroy 1996). At the same 
time, trade liberalization – a standard reform pressed by the IFIs – results in the loss of 
tariff revenues, squeezing the fiscal capacity of governments to fund peace-related 
programs.2
 
In principle, conditionality can also be harnessed directly to the objective of promoting 
peace. Where there is a risk of violent conflict, the aid ‘carrot’ can be designed to provide 
incentives for steps to reduce social tensions. In war-torn societies, aid can serve as an 
inducement for conflict resolution. And where a negotiated settlement has been achieved, 
donors can use ‘peace conditionality’ to encourage the implementation of peace accords 
and consolidation of peace, outcomes that are far from a foregone conclusion.3
 
In practice, efforts to reorient conditionality to these ends have been the exception rather 
than the rule, and where attempted, the results have been mixed. Three constraints have 
contributed to this spotty record. First, domestic parties may not wield sufficient authority, 
or enjoy sufficient legitimacy, to strike and implement aid-for-peace bargains. Second, the 
amount of aid on offer may be inadequate to provide a compelling incentive for the adoption 
of pro-peace policies. And finally, donor governments and agencies themselves may not put 
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peace at the top of their agendas, ahead of other geopolitical, commercial, and institutional 
objectives. 
 
Economic versus Political Stabilization? Balancing the budget deficit 
 
Attempts to build a durable peace often require fiscal measures that fly in the face of 
conventional IFI policies. For example, the IMF, in its pursuit of the objective of 
macroeconomic stabilization, often requires the borrower government to cut its budget 
deficit to specified percentages of GDP before successive installments of an IMF loan can 
be disbursed. Whatever the wisdom of these deficit-reduction targets – itself often a matter 
of debate4 – in regions emerging from civil war their feasibility and desirability must be 
viewed through the distinctive lens of the requirements of establishing a viable peace. 
Insofar as the IMF’s usual macroeconomic prescriptions clash with the aim of building 
peace, there is a compelling case for rethinking those prescriptions.  
 
The need to rethink conventional wisdom emerged quite clearly during in the early years of 
Cambodia’s reconstruction efforts. Following the initial period of UN administration, the 
IMF and World Bank pressed the country’s new coalition government to downsize the civil 
service by 20%. A senior UN official explained: 
 
The IMF just applied its standard ratio: your population is 11 million people, so the 
size of your civil service should be x. But the historical circumstances here are 
almost unique. In 1979 Cambodia was a wasteland. It had no civil service, no 
banking, no money. Ninety per cent of the intelligentsia was dead. The new 
government put together a system, starting from nothing. They paid people in rice to 
teach. The fact that these people were not trained teachers is not their fault. You 
can’t tell them now, ‘You’re useless,’ and throw them on the scrap heap. It’s not 
decent, and it’s not possible politically.5
 
Instead of cutting public employment, the coalition government expanded it by about 15% 
to accommodate jobseekers from the erstwhile opposition. In an effort to appease the 
donors, the government trimmed the budget deficit by cutting non-salary expenditures. ‘The 
outcome was “remarkable progress” on the macroeconomic balances,’ a subsequent World 
Bank evaluation dryly observed, ‘combined with continued erosion of non-maintained 
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infrastructure and of health, education and other services’ (World Bank 1998a, emphasis in 
original). 
 
Similar tensions between fiscal austerity and reconstruction efforts arose in post-war 
Mozambique. Asserting that macroeconomic stabilization was an ‘absolute prerequisite,’ the 
IMF pressed in 1995 for spending cuts and a rollback in a scheduled increase in the 
minimum wage. Fearing that these moves would jeopardize the long-term goals of 
economic recovery and political stabilization, the ambassadors of the US, the Netherlands 
and Canada, and the resident representatives of the EU, UNDP, Finland and Switzerland, 
took the unusual step of writing a joint letter to the Fund to voice their concerns (Hanlon 
1996; Ball and Barnes 2000).6 In the end, a compromise was hammered out: the spending 
cutbacks were slowed and the minimum wage increase remained in place. 
 
Proponents of macroeconomic discipline argue, quite rightly, that rampant inflation can 
undermine political stability as well as economic recovery, and that inflation often hits 
especially hard at the real incomes of the poor. These are good reasons to control 
inflation by means of fiscal and monetary discipline. But policy makers do not face an 
all-or-nothing choice between hyperinflation and draconian austerity: fiscal and monetary 
stringency is invariably a matter of degree. It is true that beyond a certain point, 
profligate spending and soaring deficits could trigger rapid inflation and spark economic 
distress and political unrest. In the range between moderate deficits and none at all, 
however, a tradeoff often exists between the size of the deficit on the one hand and the 
social tensions generated by inadequate public expenditure on the other. Within this 
intermediate zone, higher government budget deficits can reduce social tensions by 
financing peace-related expenditures (Pastor and Boyce 2000). 
 
In other words, the relationship between the macroeconomic stability and political 
stability may take the shape of an inverted ‘U’, rather than a straight line. This is depicted 
in Figure 1. The horizontal axis represents price stability, with movement away from the 
origin denoting lower inflation. The vertical axis represents political stability, with 
movement away from the origin denoting lower social tensions. Supporters of stringent 
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anti-inflation policies assume that the country is on the upward-sloping part of the curve, 
segment AB, where greater macroeconomic stability fosters greater political stability. On 
the other hand, in asserting that there is a tradeoff between the two, critics of these 
policies assume that the country is on the downward-sloping segment, BC. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Price stability and political stability  
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Both scenarios are plausible. Research at the interface between macroeconomics and 
conflict impact assessment is needed to estimate where the turning point is located in any 
given time and place. Equally important is to explore policies that might shift the curve, 
easing potential tradeoffs between macroeconomic and political stability. If, for example, 
there is scope for shifting public expenditure from items that do little to consolidate peace 
to other uses that are central to this goal, this would help to reconcile the two stability 
objectives. 
 
Although some relaxation of budget-deficit targets may be warranted to advance the goal 
of political stabilization, the scope for financing public spending by this route is limited: 
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at some point, price instability will feed into political instability. Printing money may 
increase the government’s room for maneuver at the margin, but it is not a ‘soft’ 
substitute for domestic revenue mobilization. As Coats (2007, p. 215) remarks, ‘the 
possibility of central bank lending to the government historically has often proven an 
irresistible temptation.’ Opening the door a crack can let in flood of inflationary finance. 
Moreover there are some cases in which very strict monetary policies – or even a 
straightjacket on the central bank’s ability to print money, in the form of ‘dollarization’ 
or a currency board – can enhance political stability, by taking a bone of contention off 
the table. Coats (2007) argues that was the case in Bosnia, where a currency board 
arrangement was mandated in the Dayton peace agreement. There may be good 
arguments for recalibrating monetary discipline in light of the political demands of war-
to-peace transitions, but there is no good argument for abandoning it. 
 
Peace Conditionality 
 
The term ‘peace conditionality’ was coined in a UN-sponsored study of economic policy 
in El Salvador in the mid-1990s (Boyce et al., 1995).7 The study suggested that in 
‘postconflict’ settings, following a negotiated peace accord, donors can and should tie 
reconstruction and development aid to concrete steps to implement the accord and 
consolidate the peace. In the case of El Salvador, the government’s failure to implement 
key aspects of the 1992 peace accord – including the provision of adequate funds for 
high-priority peace programs, such as the land transfer program for ex-combatants and 
the creation of a national civilian police force – jeopardized the peace process (de Soto 
and Castillo, 1994).8 Hence the study recommended that the IFIs should apply peace 
conditionality to encourage the government to mobilize domestic resources to fulfill its 
commitments. 
 
The aid pledged at international donor conferences after the signing of a peace accord is 
conditional from its inception, in the sense that the accord is necessary to unlock the 
pledges. Subsequent aid disbursements are inherently conditional, too, insofar as 
resumption of violence would trigger suspension of aid, and failure to make progress 
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toward building peace would jeopardize future aid commitments. Peace conditionality 
moves beyond these all-or-nothing choices, in which the aid tap is either ‘on’ or ‘off.’ 
Instead it seeks to calibrate the flow of support the peace process by tying specific aid 
agreements to specific steps to build peace.9
 
Peace conditionality can be applied to reconstruction and development aid, but most 
observers agree that it should not be applied to humanitarian assistance for both ethical 
and practical reasons. Ethically, it would be untenable to punish vulnerable people for the 
sins of their leaders. And practically, the leaders may not be terribly sensitive to 
humanitarian needs. Since conditionality usually involves specific aid agreements rather 
than across-the-board cutoffs, there is room for flexibility in deciding what types of aid 
will carry what conditions. A starting point for the application of conditionality is those 
types of aid that are most valued by political leaders and least crucial for the survival of 
at-risk populations (Boyce, 2002a). 
 
Aid officials sometimes disclaim responsibility for engaging with the political issues of war 
and peace. At the World Bank, for example, officials at times invoke their mandate to make 
loans ‘with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to 
political or other non-economic influences or considerations.’10 Yet violent conflict has 
profound economic implications. For this reason, in the case of El Salvador an internal 
World Bank evaluation concluded that ‘if tax effort and the pattern of public expenditures 
have a direct bearing on post-conflict reconstruction, as they did in El Salvador, it is 
legitimate to include these parameters in the conditionality agenda’ (World Bank, 1998b, p. 
51). 
 
The application of peace conditionality to fiscal policy is not a great stretch for the IFIs, 
institutions with a long history of applying conditionality to issues such as budget deficit 
reduction and trade liberalization. In the fiscal arena, peace conditionality simply 
involves a reorientation of objectives toward the goal of building peace. In some cases, 
this may mean relaxing budget deficit targets to permit governments to finance high-
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priority peace programs. In others, it means paying more attention to the composition of 
public expenditures, the level of tax revenues, and the distributional impacts of 
expenditure and taxation (Boyce, 2002a, ch. 3). 
 
Donors occasionally have pushed the envelope further, applying peace conditionality in 
arenas beyond their usual concerns. At a donor conference on aid to Bosnia, soon after the 
1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, European Commissioner Hans van den Broek and World 
Bank president James Wolfensohn declared: 
 
 Developments on the ground should be constantly reviewed to ensure that aid is 
conditional on the thorough implementation of the obligations undertaken by all 
parties, in particular, full co-operation with the international tribunal for the 
prosecution of war criminals (European Commission and World Bank, 1996). 
 
In keeping with this stance – and spurred by US legislation that instructed the US 
representatives on IFI executive boards to oppose loans to countries or entities not 
cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia – the World 
Bank and IMF blocked loans to Croatia in 1997 until the Tudjman regime turned over ten 
indicted war crimes suspects to stand trial in the Hague (Boyce, 2002a; Dinmore, 1997), 
an episode that demonstrated that where there is the will to apply peace conditionality, 
even for unconventional purposes, ways to do so can be found. In recent years, formal 
and informal conditions attached to the European Union accession process have emerged 
as another powerful lever for political reforms and peace implementation in the former 
Yugoslavia.11
 
In some quarters, ‘conditionality’ is a dirty word. It is portrayed – sometimes with good 
reason – as an intrusion on national sovereignty, a device for powerful aid donors to 
impose their preferences upon hapless aid recipients. Partly for this reason, and partly for 
the pragmatic reason that experience shows that externally imposed conditions often fail 
to produce real reform, many donors, including the IFIs, now embrace the need for 
domestic ‘ownership’ of reform agendas. The practical counterpart to this shift in rhetoric 
has been a move from conditionality to ‘selectivity,’ whereby aid is preferentially 
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allocated to governments that already have embraced the policies preferred by the 
donor.12
 
Whatever the merits of this stance, it fails to come to grips with the challenges often 
posed in post-conflict settings for two reasons. First, in the aftermath of violent conflict, 
‘good policies’ and state capacities to implement them tend to be in short supply. If 
donors choose simply to wait until these emerge, they may have to wait a very long time. In 
the meantime, a wait-and-see attitude could impose high costs on innocent people within 
these societies, and on others if renewed violence spills beyond national borders. 
 
Second, once we recognize that countries are comprised of diverse individuals, groups, 
and classes with divergent interests, it is impossible to speak unequivocally of ‘country 
ownership’ of policies.  Instead we find a variety of policy alternatives supported by 
contending forces, both inside and outside the government. The ownership and 
implementation of any given policy mix requires a political process of domestic coalition 
building. External assistance widens the scope of the coalition-building process to include 
international allies.13 The challenge for donors, therefore, is not to select countries should 
receive aid, but rather to select who within the recipient countries should receive aid, and 
what policy objectives the donors should support. 
 
In Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP), 
initiated under the transitional government in 2005, addressed to the problem of 
mismanagement of public finances and the attendant threat to peace implementation by 
providing international representatives with co-signatory authority in selected ministries and 
state-owned enterprises (an example of ‘dual control’ as a strategy to address problems of 
corruption, an issue discussed below in the context of building fiscal capacity). This unusual 
external intervention was a response to malfeasance in the Liberia’s transitional 
government; as such, as Dwan and Bailey (2006, p. 21) remark, it was ‘unlikely to be 
wholly “owned” by it.’ Conditionality played a key role in persuading the government to 
accept GEMAP: the United States threatened to withhold security sector reform assistance, 
the EU warned that it would shelve a planned aid package, and the World Bank threatened 
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to follow the IMF which had already pulled out of the country; and the threat of a travel ban 
on top officials under U.N. Security Council sanctions provided further leverage.14
 
Peace conditionality can be applied at the local level, too. In its ‘Open Cities’ program in 
Bosnia, for example, the UN High Commission for Refugees allocated reconstruction aid 
to municipalities that demonstrated a commitment to the right of refugees and internally 
displaced persons to return to their homes. The aim was to use aid to reward local authorities 
who sought to implement the Dayton accord, penalize those who obstructed 
implementation, and encourage vacillators to get off the fence (Boyce, 2002a, p. 18).15  
 
In addition to supporting ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding, conditionality can be used in 
efforts to promote the resolution of ongoing conflicts and to prevent conflict from 
breaking out in the first place. There is an important difference, however, between the 
situation following a peace accord and cases where violent conflict is actively underway 
or where there is a high risk of it breaking out. In ‘postconflict’ settings, the peace accord 
furnishes a set of benchmarks that have been formally accepted by the warring parties. 
Donors can judge performance against these benchmarks. In pre-conflict or conflict 
settings, donors do not have ready-made criteria on which to base conditionality, so they 
must develop the benchmarks themselves. In this respect, countries with negotiated peace 
agreements are especially suitable for the application of conditionality for peace-related 
ends. 
 
Part II: Building Fiscal Capacity 
 
External assistance during the war-to-peace transition can help to finance economic 
recovery, social expenditures, and peace implementation programs including the 
establishment of new democratic institutions. Sooner or later, however, the flow of aid 
will diminish, and responsibility for ongoing public expenditures must be shouldered by 
the government. A crucial issue during postwar transitions is the building of state 
capacities to mobilize domestic revenue and to allocate and manage expenditure. 
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In this part, I analyze four issues at the interface between external assistance and the 
public-finance dimensions of postwar statebuilding: (i) Can the pathologies of a ‘dual 
public sector’ – one funded and managed by the government, the other by the aid donors 
– be surmounted by channeling external resources through the government, with dual-
control oversight mechanisms to curtail corruption? (ii) Can postwar external assistance 
do more to prime the pump of domestic revenue capacity? (iii) How should distributional 
impacts enter into revenue and expenditure policies? (iv) Lastly, how should long-term 
fiscal sustainability enter into short-term expenditure decisions? 
 
(i) Dual public sector or dual control? External support for domestic expenditure 
 
The international community often seeks to help postwar governments to develop fiscal 
capacity to allocate and manage expenditure by providing technical assistance. More 
could be done, however, if donors were to channel a greater share of their resources 
through the state rather than bypassing it. Key stumbling blocks to doing so are the 
problems of combating corruption and need to ensure fiduciary responsibility.  
 
The current practice of routing the lion’s share of external assistance outside the 
government gives rise to a ‘dual public sector’: an internal public sector that is funded 
and managed by the government, and an external public sector that is funded and 
managed by the donors. In sheer money terms, the latter frequently dwarfs the former. 
This has several adverse consequences: 
 
• Most evident is the opportunity cost of failing to tap these resources to build state 
capacities to allocate and manage public expenditure. 
 
• Less obvious, but no less serious, is the ‘crowding-out’ effect as professionals are 
recruited into the external public sector, often at salaries that the government 
cannot match.16 Ironically, aid donors then point to lack of capable government 
personnel as a rationale for continuing to bypass the state.  
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• The fact that the external public sector is managed by numerous agencies, each 
with their own priorities, poses enormous coordination problems. This leads to the 
waste of scarce administrative resources, as government ministries cope with the 
different reporting systems of multiple funders.  
 
• Last but not least, there are no institutional mechanisms that make donor agencies 
accountable to the local citizenry.17 No matter how imperfect the degree of 
democratic governance, the state arguably has a comparative advantage in this 
respect.  
 
When pressed on this issue, donors maintain that they (and the non-governmental 
organizations and private contractors on whom they often rely) do a more effective job 
than the government in delivering goods and services. This is not an argument that can be 
dismissed lightly. There undoubtedly are situations in which the short-run advantages of 
circumventing the state are compelling. But once we recognize that the long-run aim of 
aid is – or ought to be – to build state capacities as well as to deliver services, the 
argument loses at least some of its force. 
 
Moreover, experience shows that the ‘short run’ invoked by donors can last a long time. 
In Cambodia, where more than a decade has elapsed since the United Nations transitional 
administration handed power to a new government, Smoke and Taliercio (2007, pp. 69, 
81) observe that the donors’ focus on delivering results still leads them to ‘bypass when 
possible—and capture when not—the Cambodian civil service,’ and that spending on 
technical assistance remains two to three times greater than the total wages paid to 
government civil servants. One cannot help feeling that something is wrong with this 
picture. 
 
Concerns about corruption in the internal public sector are often a significant impediment 
to channeling more external assistance through the state. Corruption saps the delivery of 
public services, deters private investment, and fuels popular discontent (Rose-Ackerman 
1999). But efforts to combat it are complicated where corruption helps to maintain 
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political cohesion by redistributing resources through informal channels. Not all 
corruption is equally corrupt, or equally corrosive: in some it is driven entirely by 
individual greed, but in others it provides patronage resources for wider networks. An 
example of the latter is the use of government revenues and profits from state-sanctioned 
monopolies to lubricate ‘neopatrimonial’ governance in the Palestinian Authority under 
Yasser Arafat (see Brynen 2000, 2007). 
 
Donors often adopt an avoidance strategy for dealing with this problem: avoid ‘leakages’ 
by bypassing the government, and avoid public discussion of the topic for fear of ruffling 
political feathers. This strategy is dysfunctional for three reasons. First, aid that is routed 
outside the government is insulated from neither the perception nor the reality of 
corruption.18 Indeed, the lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms can fuel 
public perceptions that externally administered projects are even more prone to 
corruption than government projects.19 Second, the avoidance strategy fails to harness aid 
to build state capacity to budget and manage public expenditure effectively. Third, the 
refusal of donor agencies to route resources through the government sends an 
unmistakable signal to the populace: the government cannot be trusted. This has a 
negative feedback effect on domestic revenue mobilization, insofar as willingness to pay 
taxes hinges on perceptions that the state will deliver services in return. 
 
An alternative strategy for addressing problems of corruption would have two prongs. 
The first is to devise transitional adjustment assistance programs for people who have 
been dependent on patronage networks, recognizing that corruption for such 
“neopatrimonial” purposes differs from personal corruption. Such assistance would be 
analogous, in a sense, to job training programs for workers displaced by the effects of 
trade liberalization in industrialized countries, and – closer to home – to the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs for ex-combatants that are often 
implemented in postwar countries.   
 
The second prong of an alternative anti-corruption strategy is the use of dual-control 
systems to build institutions for accountability and transparency alongside public 
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expenditure capacities. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), a World 
Bank-administered account through which donors help to fund to the government’s 
recurrent budget, offers an instructive model for how donors can route aid through the 
government – in effect, helping to internalize external resources (Ghani et al. 2007). The 
Afghan government allocates these external resources through its internal budgetary 
process, reinforcing the budget as the central instrument of policy. When the ministries 
spend the money – for example, paying teachers – an external monitoring agent 
appointed by the World Bank verifies that the accounting standards of the ARTF and 
government (which are the same) have been met, and releases the funds. The ARTF thus 
is like a bank account with a fiduciary screen, similar in this respect to the dual-control 
arrangements established in Liberia under GEMAP. Approximately two-thirds of the 
Afghan government’s non-security recurrent budget is now being funded by the ARTF, 
although this amount remains small relative to total external assistance (Scanteam 2005). 
 
Channeling aid through the government in this fashion does not imply that the donors 
abdicate control or responsibility for how their resources are used. The ARTF does not 
issue blank checks. Two signatures are required to release funds, one from the 
government and one from the external monitoring agent. The result is a dual-control 
system – a setup analogous to the dual-key system used to prevent an accidental launch 
of nuclear missiles.20
 
(ii) Priming the pump? External support for domestic revenue mobilization 
 
In many postwar settings, a central task is to raise domestic revenue to provide 
sustainable funding for new democratic institutions and for expenditures to improve 
human well-being, strengthen public security, and ease social tensions. The size of 
government revenue relative to gross domestic product in wartorn societies typically is 
far below the average for other countries with similar per capita income.21 Yet the needs 
for government expenditure are, if anything, greater. Hence concerted efforts are needed 
to increase revenues. 
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Experience has shown that aid can ‘crowd out’ domestic revenue mobilization, reducing 
the incentive for the government to tax its own populace.22 If aid instead is to ‘crowd in’ 
domestic revenue, conscious efforts are needed to this end. The international community 
can support government efforts to mobilize domestic in four ways: (a) by providing 
technical assistance; (b) by linking some of its aid to progress in domestic revenue 
performance; (c) by helping to curb extra-legal revenue exactions; and (d) by reducing 
tax exemptions on postwar aid. 
 
(a) Technical assistance (TA) is the most common type of support. The IMF, World 
Bank, and bilateral donors have helped to develop revenue capacities, ranging from 
drafting tax codes to setting special tax administration units within finance ministries 
with special training and higher pay in an effort to insulate them from corruption. 
 
In some cases, TA providers have shown an impressive ability to cast aside orthodoxies 
and adapt their policy advice to local realities. For example, despite the aversion of the 
IFIs to trade taxes, import duties were recognized as the most feasible source of revenue 
enhancement in Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. In the case of Timor-Leste, the 
IMF even supported introduction of a levy on coffee exports (see Pires and Francino 
2007, p. 131), a policy that verges on the heretical. In other cases, however, orthodoxy 
has triumphed over pragmatism. In Guatemala, for example, even as the IMF gave 
rhetorical support to the revenue-enhancement goal mandated by the peace accords, the 
Fund’s staff urged the government to cut tariffs.23  
 
The effectiveness of TA could be further strengthened by efforts to adopt technologies 
and procedures that build on existing capacities, rather than opting for off-the-shelf 
imported solutions. In Afghanistan, for example, Ghani et al. (2007, p. 175) recall that 
computerized information systems introduced at the Ministry of Finance were ‘unsuitable 
in terms of complexity and language,’ prompting subsequent efforts to retool with 
Persian-language systems from Iran. More attention to training local personnel, rather 
than simply substituting for them, could also foster capacity building. In Timor-Leste, 
Pires and Francino (2007, p. 147) remark that the concentration on expatriate advisory 
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services was accompanied by ‘some neglect for formal training programs for national 
staff.’ The ultimate goal of technical assistance is to become redundant. 
 
(b) Conditionality is a second way that donors can encourage domestic resource 
mobilization. On the expenditure side of fiscal policy, it is not unusual for donors to 
require ‘counterpart funding’ by the government as a condition for aid to specific 
projects, a strategy intended to ensure domestic ‘buy-in’ and to counteract fungibility 
(whereby aid merely frees government money for other uses). But on the revenue side, 
conditionality of this type has been rare. It would be a straightforward matter to link 
certain types of aid – notably budget support – to progress in meeting domestic revenue 
targets. Such a policy is akin to the provision of ‘matching grants’ by private foundations. 
In both cases, the aim is to strengthen incentives for aid recipients to seek further 
resources, counteracting the disincentive effects of unconditional aid. 
 
Visiting Guatemala in May 1997, a few months after the signing of that country’s peace 
accords, IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus took a broad step in this direction 
when he stated that the Fund’s only condition for a stand-by agreement would be that the 
government comply with its peace-accord commitments, including a 50% increase in the 
revenue-to-GDP ratio.24 Making a tighter linkage, the European Union conditioned its 
budget support to the government of Mozambique in 2002 on increases in domestic 
revenue.25 One of the benchmarks in the Afghanistan Compact signed in London in early 
2006, which sets out the framework for international assistance to that country over the 
next five years, is to increase the revenue/GDP ratio from 4.5% in 2004/05 to 8% in 
2010/11.26 But conditionality with respect to revenue mobilization remains the exception, 
not the rule (for discussion, see Carnahan 2007). 
 
(c) Curbing extra-legal revenue exactions is a task located on the cusp between public 
finance and security. When profits from the exploitation of nominally public resources, 
like Cambodia’s forests, flow into the private pockets, this not only deprives the state of 
revenues but also often finances quasi-autonomous armed groups that threaten the peace 
(Le Billon 2000). When local warlords levy ‘taxes’ on trade, sometimes including trade 
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in narcotics, as in Afghanistan, they undermine the state’s monopoly not only on revenue 
collection but also on the legitimate exercise of force. Curtailing such activities may 
require international assistance. Yet peacekeeping forces, even those with a relatively 
expansive mandate like the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, typically have not seen this as a part of their job. 
 
Even more problematic, powerful members of the international community may be 
reluctant to crack down on extra-legal revenue exactions when they regard those involved 
as political allies. In Afghanistan, for example, efforts to consolidate revenue in the hands 
of the state and to fight drug trafficking have been complicated – to put it lightly – by the 
decision of the United States government to enlist anti-Taliban warlords as partners in its 
‘global war on terror.’ Such marriages of convenience, reminiscent of U.S. support to the 
anti-Soviet mujahadeen in the 1980s, may serve short-run security objectives, but do so 
only at the expense of undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state – and 
ultimately security too – in the long run (for further discussion see Sedra and 
Middlebrook 2005; Ahmad 2006). 
 
(d) Reducing tax exemptions on postwar aid flows could do much to prime the pump of 
domestic revenue-collection capacity. In the first postwar years, aid often is the single 
biggest component of the formal-sector economy. Yet today aid flows, and many of the 
incomes generated by them, are tax-exempt. The incomes of expatriate aid officials and 
aid workers are often tax-free.27 The incomes of their local staff, often quite high by local 
standards, are often tax-free too. The goods imported by the aid agencies, ranging from 
Toyota land cruisers to cases of Coca-Cola and whiskey, are often tax-free. The rents 
paid by expatriates for office space and housing – again, often exorbitant by local 
standards – are often tax-free. So are other services provided to them, such as hotels and 
restaurants. 
 
These pervasive exemptions have several adverse consequences. Most obvious is the 
opportunity cost of foregone government revenues. In addition, scarce administrative 
capacity is devoted to administering different rules for different people. Goods that enter 
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the country as aid may wind up on sale in local markets, undercutting legitimate 
competitors who pay import duties. Last but not least, the special treatment accorded to 
expatriates again sends an unmistakable message to the local populace: rich and powerful 
people do not have to pay taxes. The result can be ‘the creation of a culture of tax 
exemptions,’ in the words of a recent IMF review of postconflict experiences (Gupta et 
al. 2005, p. 12). This demonstration effect runs precisely counter to efforts to establish 
effective and progressive revenue collection systems. It also undermines the credibility of 
international agencies when they argue that governments should reduce tax loopholes and 
‘tax incentives’ for local businesses. 
 
Efforts to tax aid bonanzas have run into adamant resistance from aid donors. In Timor-
Leste, efforts to tax the floating hotels in the Dili harbor that accommodated the postwar 
influx of foreigners were rebuffed by lawyers at United Nations headquarters in New 
York, on the dubious grounds that diplomatic ‘privileges and immunities’ extend to those 
who provide services to U.N. personnel (Pires and Francino 2007, p. 136). In 
Afghanistan, the introduction of a tax on rental incomes generated by expatriates in 
Kabul likewise met resistance; as Ghani et al. (2007, p. 174) remark, ‘the international 
community’s declarations on the importance of enhancing domestic revenue mobilization 
have not been matched by willingness to consider new initiatives to tap the revenue 
possibilities generated by their own presence.’  
 
This issue has often pitted the IMF and World Bank, along with national officials, against 
other donor agencies. In Timor-Leste, Pires and Francino (2007, p. 136) recall ‘bitter 
fights between international officials at the Ministry of Finance and international officials 
of donor organizations … with the latter winning’: 
 
Generally the donors and the UN, who disagreed about many things, were as one 
on their inviolable right to a complete exemption from taxes, not only for 
themselves as individuals or for goods imported for their direct use, but also on 
their contractors and goods imported for reconstruction.  
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Similarly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) ‘ferociously defended every inch of 
ground’ in resisting taxation of even their local employees: ‘Even when UNTAET 
offered to pay the taxes of international staff working with NGOs provided they were 
prepared to declare the income they were receiving, the answer was still “No”.’ 
 
Donor officials make three arguments against paying taxes. The first is that this would be 
equivalent to budget support. This is true. But its implicit premise – that the government 
cannot be trusted to use tax revenues well – again sends a clear message to the local 
populace. The second argument is that expatriates were already paying taxes in their 
countries of origin. In cases where this is so, existing tax treaties allow credits for taxes 
paid elsewhere, avoiding the problem of double taxation. The third argument is that other 
countries do not tax them, so why should any country be different? The answer to this 
objection is that all desirable changes have to begin somewhere. 
 
Income tax payments by expatriate or local aid personnel would need not to come from 
their own pockets. Those who pay taxes could be given salary ‘top-ups’ to maintain their 
after-tax incomes. This is the current practice for U.S. citizens employed by the United 
Nations, World Bank and IMF, who must pay income taxes (unlike their non-U.S. co-
workers) but who then receive compensating pay increments in interest of horizontal 
equity. 
 
Initiatives to tap aid inflows for domestic revenue could also take the form of ‘payments 
in lieu of taxes’ (PILOTs), a solution that has been adopted in many college towns in the 
U.S. where municipal governments understandably want tax-exempt institutions of 
higher education to contribute to funding public schools, police and fire protection, and 
other local services. PILOTs maintain the legal privileges of those who make them. At 
the same time, they open the door for those donors who are serious about building 
domestic revenue capacity to act without waiting for across-the-board solutions.   
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(iii) Who pays taxes & who benefits from expenditure? Fiscal policy through a conflict 
lens 
 
Fiscal policy making in postwar settings requires careful attention to questions of what 
and to whom.  
 
The ‘what’ question is about priorities. Faced with many pressing needs – for spending in 
areas such as public safety, the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, health, 
education, and the rehabilitation of economic infrastructure  – how should scarce 
resources best be allocated? The aim must be not simply to maximize returns defined in 
terms of conventional development indicators, but also to get the most ‘non-bang for the 
buck’ in terms of building a durable peace. 
 
Underscoring this point, the synthesis report emerging from the World Bank’s research 
program on violent conflict observes that this ‘creates the potential for trade-offs between 
policies that promote growth and those that promote peace’ (Collier et al. 2003, p. 166). 
In particular, a strategy focused exclusively on short-term economic returns might 
concentrate spending on the capital city and developed regions, leading to ‘a trade-off 
between the growth-maximizing geographic distribution of public expenditure and a 
distribution that might be regarded as fair.’ Where such trade-offs exist, the report 
concludes, ‘the government may need to give priority to policies for peace building.’ 
 
When viewed through a conflict lens, the ‘what’ question in public expenditure cannot be 
divorced from the ‘to whom’ question. As Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007, p. 35) 
observe, not only are grievances rooted in distributional inequalities often important 
drivers of conflict, but also inequalities often worsen during conflict: 
 
The already poor often lose the few assets they have, and looting adds to the 
number of poor. In contrast, warlords and their followers accumulate assets, and 
so while the early years of peace may see quite rapid growth it can be very 
narrow in its benefits – unless policies are put in place to restore the productive 
assets and human capital of the poor. 
 
 24
Two sets of distributional issues are particularly relevant in public expenditure. The first 
is how to incorporate vertical and horizontal equity concerns into spending decisions. The 
second is how to allocate expenditures across the political landscape so as to bolster 
incentives for the implementation of accords and the consolidation of peace.   
 
Conflict impact assessments could address both sets of issues. These are analogous to 
environmental impact assessments, first introduced in the 1970s, with the difference that 
here the concern is the social and political environment rather than the natural 
environment. Just as environmental impact assessment aims to incorporate ‘negative 
externalities’ of pollution and natural resource depletion into expenditure policies, so 
conflict impact assessment aims to incorporate the ‘negative externalities’ of social 
tensions and violent conflict. 
 
International aid agencies increasingly recognize the need for conflict impact assessment 
as an input into policy making and project appraisal, and some have begun to put this 
recognition into practice (see, for example, World Bank 2002; DfID 2003; USAID 2005, 
SIDA 2006).28 Yet efforts to incorporate distributional considerations into expenditure 
decisions in postconflict countries are still at a very early stage. Information on vertical 
equity – the distribution of benefits across the poor-to-rich spectrum – is sometimes 
collected and sometimes used as an input into policy making. In many cases, however, 
even such basic data are not available.  
 
In the case of horizontal equity – distribution across regions and groups defined on the 
basis of race, ethnicity, language, or religion – the paucity of information is even more 
severe. In the past decade, researchers have analyzed the role of horizontal equity in the 
genesis of civil wars (Stewart 2000, 2002; Østby 2004), and economists have begun to 
think hard about how to measure it, starting with spatial inequalities across regions 
(Kanbur and Venables 2005; Stewart et al. 2007). But at best, conflict impact assessment 
today is roughly where environmental impact assessment was three decades ago, its 
importance accepted in principle, but with a long way to go in developing the tools and 
capacities for implementation in practice. 
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Collection of regional data on expenditures in administrative units, such as states, 
provinces, and districts, would seem to be relatively straightforward, both practically 
grounds (since ministries often allocate their funds across regional units) and politically 
(since regions often can serve as a proxy for more sensitive categories such as ethnicity). 
Yet today even such data are remarkably few and far between.29 Afghanistan’s former 
finance minister and his colleagues recount their experience: 
 
Obtaining the figures on provincial expenditures from line ministries required 
months of intense discussion and analysis of manual systems of recordings. When 
the figures were first presented to the Cabinet, it came as a shock that the ten 
poorest provinces of the country were receiving the smallest amounts of 
allocation. (Ghani et al. 2007, p. 179). 
 
The only unusual feature of this experience is that the finance ministry went to the 
trouble to request this information.  
 
The ‘who’ questions that need to be addressed by conflict impact assessments of fiscal 
policies may involve more than inequalities. Some researchers have been suggested that 
conflict is better understood as being driven by polarization rather than inequality per se. 
Polarization refers to the interaction between alienation across groups and identification 
within groups; income polarization, for example, is higher when the gap between rich and 
poor is greater (resulting in greater alienation between the two) and when income 
inequalities among the rich and poor are lower (resulting in greater identification with 
others in the same income group).  More generally, polarization is greatest under a 
symmetric bimodal or ‘twin-peak’ distribution. Esteban and Ray (1999, p. 401) make this 
argument on theoretical grounds: 
 
Polarization, not inequality as it is commonly measured, holds the key to our 
understanding of social tension and conflict. Briefly, polarization is a feature of 
distributions that combines elements of equality and inequality in a particular 
way…. Intra-group homogeneity, coupled with inter-group heterogeneity, lies at 
the heart of a polarized society, and this feature is correlated with social conflict. 
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Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a, b) offer empirical support for the proposition that 
what they term ‘ethnic polarization’ – which attains a maximum when the population is 
divided into two ethnolinguistic groups of equal size – is a statistically significant 
predictor of the likelihood of civil war. 
 
When economic polarization (in the distribution of income, wealth, or other attributes 
such as employment, education, and health) aligns with social polarization (in the 
distribution of the population into identity groups based on race, ethnicity, language, 
religion, or region), the potential for violent conflict may be multiplied. Duclos, Esteban 
and Ray (2004) speculate that a ‘hybrid’ measure of polarization, that combines social 
and economic considerations, may be a better predictor of social conflict than ‘pure 
income’ or ‘pure social’ measures confined to distribution measured on a single attribute. 
Ravi Kanbur (2007, p. 3) remarks: 
 
Polarization of society into a small number of groups with distinct identities is an 
incubator of conflict on its own. But add to this the dimension of average income 
differences between the groups, and a combustible mix is created. 
 
This insight brings us back to the importance of horizontal inequality, a concept that as 
noted above is distinct from vertical inequality, or ‘inequality as commonly measured’ in 
Esteban and Ray’s phrase. 
 
The phenomena of between-group alienation and within-group identification also have 
implications for the role of ‘social capital’ in the dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding. 
Social capital – trust, norms, and networks that facilitate coordination and cooperation – 
is often regarded as an entirely wholesome and beneficial thing. But social capital can 
also have a ‘dark side,’ insofar as it enables some groups to cooperate more effectively to 
the detriment of others. Drawing a distinction between ‘bonding’ social capital that 
promotes trust and cooperation within groups and ‘bridging’ social capital that promotes 
these between groups, Putnam (2000, p. 362) acknowledges that ‘some kinds of bonding 
capital may discourage the formation of bridging social capital and vice versa.’30  
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During civil wars, bonding social capital can be deployed for purposes of expropriation, 
pillage, rape, and murder. Meanwhile, bridging social capital is destroyed, with 
consequences that can be just as serious as losses of physical capital.31 During war-to-
peace transitions, therefore, an important aim of public expenditure, and of public 
policies more generally, is not simply to build generic social capital but rather to build 
specifically those types of social capital that reduce inter-group alienation, or what 
Putnam (1993, p. 175) terms ‘networks of civic engagement that cut across social 
cleavages.’ The potential importance of this bridging social capital is illustrated by 
Ashutosh Varshney’s (2002) analysis of Hindu-Muslim tensions in urban India, which 
points to the role of associational ties across communities in reducing the likelihood of 
communal violence. 
 
As Kanbur (2007, p. 6) observes, tensions may be present between the goal of promoting 
cross-group associational ties and other goals of economic policy. To illustrate, he notes 
that labor unions can serve as important arenas for cooperation across ethnic and 
religious cleavages; hence ‘reducing the power of trade unions is an example of a policy 
that is often put forward in the name of increasing efficiency, but could have the long run 
result of increasing group tensions.’ Where trade-offs exist, once again there are 
compelling grounds ‘to give priority to policies for peace building’ (Collier et al. 2003, p. 
166). 
 
A further dimension of the ‘who’ question in postwar settings relates to balances of 
power among and within competing political parties and their supporters. This requires 
attention not only to community-wide characteristics such as living standards and 
ethnicity, but also to the stances of individual political leaders who often vary in their 
commitment to peace. Some leaders are enthusiastic about implementing peace 
agreements, others are lukewarm, and still others are prepared to resume war rather than 
make concessions for peace. Selective allocation of public spending can be one 
instrument to reward those who are committed to peace, penalize spoilers, and encourage 
the undecided to back peace implementation.32 If, instead, public spending strengthens 
the hand of hardliners, this can contribute to an unraveling of the peace process.33
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Distributional impacts need to be considered on the revenue side of fiscal policy, too. 
This issue sometimes is slighted by economists who were taught in graduate school that 
distributional objectives are tackled most efficiently on the expenditure side of fiscal 
policy. Inattention to ‘who pays?’ questions in revenue policy is dysfunctional, however, 
for the three reasons: first, the axiom that distribution can be relegated to expenditure 
alone rests on a textbook ‘optimal planner’ model that does not fit the real world; second, 
even optimal planners would need full information on the distributional impacts of 
revenue policies to achieve their targets; and third, if the public believes that the 
distributional effects of revenue policies matter, then politically they do. 
 
Yet little has been done to bring distributional concerns to bear on revenue policies. The 
primary revenue goal of postwar government authorities, and of the international 
agencies that seek to assist them, has been to increase the volume of collections; the 
secondary goal has been to do so as ‘efficiently’ as possible. To be sure, increasing the 
volume of revenue is no small task. And efficiency – if understood in terms of the 
realities of wartorn societies, as opposed to textbook axioms – is desirable. But neglect of 
the distributional impacts of taxation can subvert both of these goals. 
 
The starting point for any effort to address this lacuna must be careful documentation of 
the distributional incidence of revenue instruments both vertically and horizontally. 
Collecting the necessary data will be a non-trivial task, for today there is a paucity of 
such information even in ‘normal’ developing countries, let alone in wartorn societies.34 
This can be contrasted with the situation in the industrialized countries, where the 
distributional impacts of proposed taxes typically are subjected to intense scrutiny by 
politicians and policy makers alike. Ironically, it is precisely where the need for such 
analysis is greatest – in societies embarked on the fragile transition from war to peace – 
that these issues receive the least attention. Technical assistance from the international 
community could play a valuable role in filling this information gap. 
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Documentation is only the first step. The second is to incorporate this information into 
policy making. In choosing the mix of revenue instruments – the balance between tariffs, 
value-added taxes and income taxes, for example – their distributional incidence must be 
considered alongside their revenue potential, administrative feasibility, and efficiency 
effects. One option that would be likely to receive much more attention, once revenue is 
seen through the distributional lens, is luxury taxation. Taxes on items such as private 
automobiles and private aircraft can combine the attractions of administrative ease, 
distributional progressivity, and substantial revenue. Remarkably, these rarely feature in 
discussions of postwar revenue policies. 
 
Finally, information on the distributional impacts of revenue instruments, and on the 
ways that government policies are taking these into account, must be disseminated widely 
to the public, so as to guard against misperceptions and facilitate compliance by 
legitimizing the policies. The importance of this was demonstrated vividly in Guatemala, 
where the peace accords set explicit targets for increasing government revenue and social 
expenditure. To this end, the first postwar government attempted to increase the tax on 
large property owners. This effort was scuttled, however, in the face of protests not only 
from estate owners but also from small-scale indigenous farmers who thought that the tax 
would burden them (Rodas-Martini 2007, p. 90: Jonas 2000, pp. 171-172). The lesson is 
clear: successful revenue policymaking cannot be a purely technocratic preserve; it must 
be part and parcel of the democratic process.  
 
(iv) Thinking about tomorrow, today? Getting serious about fiscal sustainability 
 
External resources that are spent today – regardless of whether they are channeled 
through the state or around it – often have implications for how domestic resources must 
be spent tomorrow. This is true both for recurrent expenditures, including salaries, and 
for capital expenditures that will require spending for operation and maintenance in 
future years. Hence there is an evident need to think about the long-term fiscal 
implications of current decisions. 
 
 30
In the aftermath of war, attention to pressing short-term needs is perfectly natural, and 
perfectly valid. But this does not imply that the future consequences of today’s decisions 
can or should be shunted aside for others to handle later. The long run begins in the short 
run. Myopia not only postpones getting serious about long-run problems, but also can 
make them worse. 
 
Although much can be done to enhance domestic revenue capacities, the sky is not the 
limit. Prudence demands recognition that budget constraints will always be a fact of life. 
When building new government institutions and infrastructure, this reality must be borne 
in mind. It would be a mistake to rely on a transitory flush of external funds to create 
structures that are not fiscally sustainable. The point may seem obvious, but past 
experience suggests that it is often ignored. 
 
Consider, for example, security spending in Afghanistan, where the Afghan National 
Army has been built with large-scale funding from the United States government. 
Security-sector expenditures in the three-year period from 2003/04 to 2005/06 were 
equivalent to 494% of the Afghan government’s revenue, or roughly one-third of the 
country’s GDP (World Bank 2005a, p. 42).35 ‘Total security expenditures will exceed 
forecast domestic revenues for some years to come,’ warns a recent World Bank study 
(2005a, p. 47) that describes the situation as ‘unaffordable and fiscally unsustainable.’ As 
Ghani et al. (2007, p. 182) remark: 
 
Even under very optimistic projections for domestic revenue, such an expenditure 
on security would imply a totally inadequate allocation of resources for human 
capital, infrastructure, and other vital functions of government. 
 
Even from a security standpoint, unsustainable expenditures are shortsighted. A well-
equipped army that isn’t getting paid ceases to be a security force. Instead it becomes an 
insecurity force. 
 
A recent operational note prepared jointly by the United Nations Development Group and 
the World Bank (2005, p. 4) draws the clear lesson from such experiences: ‘It is 
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important to ensure that security issues are treated as an integral part of the national 
planning and budgetary process, rather than through separate forums which may lead to a 
lack of transparency or the taking of decisions which are fiscally unsustainable or 
undermine other reconstruction efforts.’ 
 
The problem of unsustainable expenditure is not confined to the security sector. Salary 
supplements for civil servants – including ‘sitting fees’ for attending donor-funded 
workshops, where ‘the daily rates can exceed regular monthly salaries’ (Moss et al. 2005, 
p. 7) – likewise can create problems for fiscal sustainability. Citing studies showing that  
additional remuneration to civil servants in Cambodia far exceeds their regular salaries, a 
recent UNDP study concludes that ‘the principal incentive to work in public employment 
is the prospect of access to external salary supplements’ (Beresford et al. 2004, p. 33). 
 
Capital investments with high operation and maintenance costs also generate fiscal 
burdens down the road. In Palestine, Brynen (2007, p. 199) reports, aid donors have often 
ignored the development plans of the Palestinian Authority (PA), ‘undercutting any PA 
effort to monitor the cumulative long-term costs of donor-financed investments.’ Again 
he points to the resulting distortion in incentives: the ‘lure of donor money’ encouraged 
government officials to put forward projects ‘not because they were a real priority, but 
because they seemed most likely to attract some external funding.’ 
 
A famous example of a costly, donor-driven project with high ‘flagpole value’ but 
problematic fiscal implications is the Gaza hospital financed by the European Union 
(Brynen 2000, pp. 196-197). ‘Donor-driven investments in public hospitals are 
sometimes referred to as “Trojan horses”,’ notes a recent World Bank report (2005b, p. 
52), ‘because of their large operating costs which crowd resources out of priority areas 
such as the basic package of health services.’   
 
Closely related to this problem is the bias of many aid-funded projects in favor of 
excessive reliance on imports. In deciding to the extent to which the goods and services 
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purchased for relief, recovery, and reconstruction should be imported, as opposed to 
being procured locally, donors face another tension between short-run expediency and 
long-run capacity building – the capacity in this case being in the private sector. Again 
there are undoubtedly cases where the former trumps the latter: for example, where local 
sourcing would require large investments with long gestation periods. But there are also 
cases where local procurement could do more to stimulate economic recovery, and 
perhaps save money in the process. 36
 
To cite an example of the pervasive bias against local suppliers, during the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, some quarter of a million desks and 
chairs for local schools were purchased with money from the World Bank-administered 
Trust Fund for East Timor. At the time, some officials suggested that some of these be 
procured locally to spur the growth of small and medium woodworking enterprises. 
Others rejected this on the grounds that local procurement would be too slow (Pires and 
Francino 2007, pp. 141-2). This was not a life-or-death case of emergency food supplies 
where time was of the essence; the goods in question were school furniture.37
 
The interwoven challenges of building an effective state, a robust economy, and a durable 
peace all require thinking about tomorrow, today. Postwar inflows of external assistance 
cannot be sustained indefinitely. The success of this aid ultimately will rest on whether 
the structures built with it can be sustained without it. 
 
Part III: Interrogating Donor Behavior 
 
Efforts to make external assistance a more effective tool for peacebuilding face two sorts 
of obstacles. First, peace is not the sole objective of donor governments, nor is it always 
the dominant one in shaping their interventions in war-torn societies. Competing 
objectives can not only divert attention and resources in other directions, but also pose 
obstacles to building a durable peace; in other words, policy objectives may be not only 
divergent but contradictory. Second, aid agencies have their own internal dynamics 
shaped by incentive structures, ideological biases, and inter-agency rivalries. These can 
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undermine agency effectiveness even in pursuit of more familiar development objectives, 
let alone in responding to the novel challenges of building peace. This part of the paper 
examines these issues. 
 
Competing ‘national interests’  
 
In addition to peace, donor governments often pursue other objectives in war-torn societies. 
These include (i) geopolitical aims, (ii) economic and commercial interests, (iii) the 
repatriation of refugees, and (iv) responding to public opinion. 
 
(i) Geopolitical aims:  
 
The Cold War rivalry between industrial democracies and the Soviet bloc helped to fuel 
violent conflicts across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Aid was one weapon in this global 
contest. For example, because Cambodia’s government in the 1980s was backed by the 
Soviet Union and Vietnam, the United States not only withheld aid and diplomatic 
recognition, but went so far as to insist that the country’s UN seat should remain in the 
hands of the murderous Khmer Rouge. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2002, p. 
8) described the situation candidly: ‘Corruption and waste – indeed, results of any kind – 
were secondary to what donor countries wanted most, namely political allegiance.’ 
 
Despite the end of the Cold War, geopolitical considerations continue to exert profound 
impacts on the policies of external assistance actors, particularly those of bilateral donors. 
For example, the French government’s willingness to support the Habyarimana regime in 
the crucial months preceding the 1994 Rwandan genocide appears to have been driven, in 
no small measure, by the aim of backing the ‘Francophone’ Hutu against the ‘Anglophone’ 
Tutsi (see, for example, Prunier 1995). 
 
Such biases have affected the policies of the IFIs, too. A World Bank study concludes: 
‘Between 1970 and 1993 aid allocations – by bilateral and multilateral donors – were 
dominated by politics – both the international politics of the Cold War and the internal 
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politics of aid agencies’ (World Bank 1998c, p. 40). The study cites aid to Mobutu’s Zaire 
as ‘just one of several examples where a steady flow of aid ignored, if not encouraged, 
incompetence, corruption, and misguided policies.’ The World Bank itself was among the 
biggest lenders to the Mobutu regime, accounting for $1.4 billion of Zaire’s $12.3 billion 
external debt in 1994 (Ndikumana and Boyce 1998). Indeed, in the late 1980s the pressure 
from powerful governments with a preponderant share of voting power in the IFI boards to 
lend to corrupt allies was so intense that a senior IMF official warned that the Fund’s 
assistance was in danger of becoming ‘indistinguishable from political support’ (Finch 
1988). 
 
(ii) Economic and commercial interests 
 
Economic interests routinely influence foreign policy. For example, securing access to key 
raw materials, such as oil, has long been seen as a major concern of the industrialized 
countries. More surprising, perhaps, is the extent to which more mundane commercial 
motives – for instance, the pursuit of contracts for building bridges or leasing aircraft – can 
drive donor decisions. A substantial proportion of bilateral aid has been ‘tied’ to imports of 
goods and services from the donor country (de Jonquières 1996). In effect, tied aid is a 
vehicle by which donors subsidize overseas sales by their domestic private-sector 
constituents. Defenders of the practice argue that this builds ‘essential political support’ for 
foreign aid back home (Rothkopf 1998). At the same time, aid becomes a means to win 
foreign political support for business constituents in the donor country.  
 
This quest for short-term commercial advantage can erode the willingness of donors to 
exercise peace conditionality. In the mid-1990s, for example, the Cambodian government 
retaliated against the Australian government’s criticism of its human rights record by 
canceling business deals with several Australian firms. The lesson was not lost on other 
donors. ‘What is important for many of these ambassadors is to defend their few miserable 
contracts,’ a United Nations official in Phnom Penh observed. ‘It is as if they represent their 
companies rather than their countries.’38
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Recipient governments play on these fears, at times quite openly. ‘Japan is taking a lead,’ a 
Cambodian commerce ministry official declared in 1999 when denouncing political 
conditions on U.S. aid. ‘By the time the U.S. shapes up, if a U.S. company is bidding on a 
contract against a Japanese company, do you think the U.S. will win? I don’t think so’ 
(quoted by Piore 1999, p. A35). 
 
More recently, the rise of China as sub-Saharan Africa’s single largest aid donor – with its 
policy of ‘no political strings’ – has sparked new concerns as to potential tensions between 
economic and commercial objectives and peacebuilding and ‘good governance’ 
objectives.39
 
(iii) Refugee repatriation 
 
The desire to repatriate refugees can be another important objective of aid donors – 
particularly when refugees are living in the donor countries. For example, some 345,000 
Bosnians had taken refuge in Germany by the time of the Dayton peace agreement, and their 
support was costing German state and local governments approximately 1,000 DM per 
refugee per month, or four billion DM (more than $2 billion) per year (International Crisis 
Group 1998). To expedite refugee returns, the German authorities deployed incentive 
packages, repatriation assistance, and threats of deportation. There is a tension, however, 
between this objective and the aim of consolidating a lasting peace. The quickest way to 
repatriate refugees to Bosnia was not to return them to their former homes, where those who 
expelled them often continued to wield power, but instead to send them to territories under 
the control of their ‘own’ people. As a result, war-damaged houses rebuilt with donor aid are 
often occupied not by their original owners, but by returnees of the ‘right’ ethnicity – a 
practice that, in effect, converted refugees into internally displaced persons. This not only 
failed to advance the Dayton principle of ethnic re-integration, but also made this goal still 
more difficult to achieve, since the return of the original owners to their homes now would 
require relocating the new occupants. Instead of using aid to encourage local authorities to 
accept minority returns, repatriation-driven reconstruction aid helped consolidate the 
demographic results of ethnic cleansing. 
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(iv) Public opinion 
 
Donor respond, to some extent, to public opinion within the donor countries. In some cases, 
public opinion pushes donors to support peacebuilding, but in others it may operate against 
this goal. The United States government, for example, has been reluctant to exercise 
conditionality in its dealings with Israel – the top recipient of U.S. foreign aid – in order to 
encourage progress toward a peace settlement with the Palestinians. ‘If in the end Israel 
cannot accept our ideas, we will respect that decision,’ US Ambassador Edward Walker 
assured leaders of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in 1998, ‘and it 
will not affect our fundamental commitment to Israel by a single jot or tittle’ (quoted in 
Gellman, 1998). This unconditional support is often ascribed to the power of the pro-Israel 
lobby in the US, and  AIPAC in particular, which Fortune magazine rates as the second 
most influential lobbying group in Washington (Erlanger 1998; Mearsheimer and Walt 
2007). But the deep-rooted antipathy towards the Palestinian side among some US 
politicians has acquired a momentum of its own. This was demonstrated in the mid-1990s, 
when in keeping with the official Israeli policy immediately after the Oslo accords, AIPAC 
arranged for senior international officials to brief key US Congressmen to urge them to fund 
the newly created Palestinian Authority. Despite the fact that AIPAC itself was lobbying of 
behalf of the funding, Congress refused. ‘We’re not paying those terrorists!’ an influential 
Congressman exclaimed to his visitors.40
 
On other occasions, public opinion has been a force for interventions in the name of peace. 
When his aides brought him news of the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, US President 
Bill Clinton reportedly exploded, ‘I’m getting creamed!’ A few days later, he complained to 
his foreign-policy advisers that the war in Bosnia was ‘killing the US position of strength in 
the world’ (quoted in  Woodward 1996, pp. 260-261; see also Danner 1997). Ending the war 
had become identified with the president’s own stature and with the US national interest. 
Yet this same example suggests that it would be a mistake to overstate the impact of the so-
called ‘CNN effect.’ For three years prior to Srebrenica, the international news media had 
carried vivid news reports of the carnage in the former Yugoslavia, yet this failed to prompt 
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decisive action by the international community. It is not raw images that drive policy, 
Michael Ignatieff (1988) observes, but the ‘stories we tell’ about these images. Political will 
to intervene in Bosnia emerged only when the war came to be seen not just as a story of 
human suffering, but as one of failed American and European leadership. 
 
Nevertheless, the Bosnian case showed that when public opinion is sufficiently mobilized – 
and political leaders are sufficiently accountable – it can lift peace to the top of the policy 
agenda. In the wake of a negotiated ending to a civil war, this can translate into backing for 
proactive peacebuilding assistance, helping to overcome the obstacles posed by competing 
geopolitical and economic objectives. In effect, public opinion can make a ‘necessity of 
virtue’ (Sherman 1998). 
Reforming donor agencies  
 
Even if governments make peacebuilding their overriding priority war-torn societies, the 
internal dynamics of the aid agencies themselves can pose additional impediments to the 
effective use of aid for this purpose. Peacebuilding requires aid agencies to move beyond 
business-as-usual practices in several ways. First, they must reorient their internal incentive 
structures to reward performance not in terms of the quantity of aid disbursed, but rather in 
terms of the effects of aid on the objective of building peace. Second, they must overcome 
ideological biases that single-mindedly favor ‘efficiency’ over equity and the ‘free market’ 
over state interventions. Third, they must work to achieve greater coordination with other 
donors, tempering their impulse to protect their own autonomy. Finally, they must become 
more transparent and accountable to the public.  
 
(i) Changing incentive structures 
 
Aid donors often measure their own success in terms of the amount of money they disburse. 
More aid is axiomatically better than less. In the early decades of foreign aid, inadequate 
investment in physical and human capital was widely seen as the main barrier to economic 
development. ‘If money was the problem,’ a recent World Bank study observes, ‘then 
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“moving the money” was an appropriate objective for aid and aid agencies’ (World Bank 
1998c, p.10). This translated into internal incentive structures that emphasized the quantity 
of aid disbursed over the quality of results achieved. Despite much discussion of the need to 
shift to outcome-based performance measures, the baneful effects of the ‘approval and 
disbursement culture’ persist. The World Bank study concluded, for example, that project 
managers continue to see the volume of loan commitments as an end in itself and appear to 
be willing to permit ‘substantial’ sacrifices in quality in return for modest increases in the 
quantity of lending (World Bank 1998c, p. 142). 
 
The incentives facing individual staff members often reflect those facing their employers. 
‘Both donor and recipient have incentive systems that reward reaching a high volume of 
resource transfer, measured in relation to a predefined ceiling,’ a study for the Swedish 
International Development Authority remarks. ‘Non-disbursed amounts will be noted by 
executive boards or parliamentary committees and may result in reduced allocations for the 
next fiscal year’ (Edgren 1996, cited in World Bank 1998c, p. 117). The result is sometimes 
characterized as a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ syndrome. 
 
When aid is provided in the form of loans, as opposed to grants, there is an added incentive: 
new lending helps ensure that recipients continue to service past debts. In December 1995, 
for example, the IMF heralded a $45 million loan to Bosnia – the first loan issued under the 
Fund’s new emergency credit window for ‘post-conflict’ countries – as ‘a new beginning’ 
(IMF Survey 1996). But the loan’s purpose was simply to allow the new Bosnian 
government to repay a bridge loan from the Dutch government, which in turn had been 
used to repay Bosnia’s assessed share of the former Yugoslavia’s arrears to the IMF. Old 
Yugoslavian debt was thereby transformed into new Bosnian debt. A similar exercise has 
been repeated in other postwar countries. In 2002, for example, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’s arrears to the World Bank were cleared through a bridge loan from Belgium and 
France that was repaid with an Emergency Recovery Credit provided by the Bank 
(Alvarez-Plata and Brück 2007, p. 266). 
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Peace conditionality, in particular, does not fit happily into these incentive structures. If 
institutions face penalties for withholding aid, but not for disbursing it unwisely, they can be 
expected to put a premium on ‘moving the money.’ If individual staff members are 
rewarded for saying ‘yes’ but not for saying ‘no,’ they will act accordingly. Effective 
peacebuilding assistance requires that the performance of individuals and agencies be 
judged not in terms of how much aid they disburse, but in terms of how effectively this aid 
supports the goal of building a viable peace. 
 
(ii) Overcoming ideological biases 
 
Ideological fashions within the aid agencies can pose an additional impediment. In keeping 
with the precepts of neoclassical economics, for instance, donors frequently focus narrowly 
on the goal of economic ‘efficiency,’ neglecting distributional issues. This approach is 
singularly ill-suited to war-torn societies, where the prospects for peace often hinge on 
fragile balances of power. In assessing development projects and economic policies, donors 
must ask not only whether total benefits will exceed total costs – the usual bottom line in 
terms of efficiency – but also how the distribution of these benefits and costs will affect 
vertical disparities of class and horizontal cleavages of ethnicity, religion, race, and region. 
These distributional consequences may be hard to measure, as noted above, but this does not 
mean that they can be safely ignored.  
 
The ideological antipathy in some donor agencies to state interventions in economic affairs 
can also prove to be counter-productive in the wake of a civil war. If, for example, donors 
insist on tariff reductions in pursuit of the Holy Grail of free trade, this may reduce 
government revenues that are urgently needed to finance the costs of peace. Moreover, in 
some cases tariffs can help ease social tensions by protecting the livelihoods of vulnerable 
domestic producers. In postwar El Salvador, for example, producer prices for maize and 
beans, the mainstays of peasant farming, were undercut by cheap imports. Nevertheless, the 
World Bank lauded the government’s steep reductions in agricultural tariffs, arguing that ‘to 
reintroduce protection could set precedents that could be extremely difficult to reverse in the 
future’ (World Bank 1998b, p. 41). This doctrinaire stance not only ignored the possibility 
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that tariffs can be a ‘second-best’ remedy for market imperfections (including foreign 
agricultural subsidies and overvalued exchange rates that artificially depress world market 
prices), but also ignored the importance of an economically viable small-farm sector for the 
sustainability of the country’s peace process.  Policies ought to be judged in light of their 
impact on economic and political reconstruction, not on the basis of a priori ideological 
dogma. 
 
(iii) Improving inter-donor coordination 
 
Effective aid for peace also requires donors to grow beyond business as usual by improving 
coordination among themselves.41 If one donor insists, for example, that local authorities 
take steps to encourage minority returns in order to receive housing reconstruction aid, while 
another offers similar aid with weaker conditions or none at all, the lowest common 
denominator will prevail. 
 
Inter-donor coordination may be more feasible following a civil war than in ‘normal’ 
circumstances. In addition to the potential rewards being higher, international engagement in 
the peace process often leads to the creation of some coordination mechanisms inside and 
outside the country. The most ambitious examples of in-country coordination to date have 
been the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia, and the Joint Liaison 
Committee and Local Aid Coordination Committee in Palestine. These were complemented 
by external coordination via the Peace Implementation Council steering board in the case of 
Bosnia, and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) in the case of Palestine. The 
establishment of these coordination mechanisms was far from smooth, however, and their 
success in overcoming inter-donor rivalries has been a matter of degree. 
 
Although the OHR’s powers in Bosnia are about as close as the contemporary world comes 
to a colonial administration, its ability to impose consistent policies on the donors is quite 
limited. The Dayton Peace Agreement specified that in dealing with aid agencies, the High 
Representative shall ‘respect their autonomy within their spheres of operation, while as 
necessary giving general guidance to them about the impact of their activities on the 
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implementation of the peace settlement.’42 In other words, the OHR must rely on 
persuasion, not authority.  
 
The difficulty in creating the AHLC to oversee aid to the Palestinian Authority is another 
telling example. The major powers decided to establish the committee in October 1993, 
shortly after the Oslo accord between Israel and the PLO.  Intense rivalries immediately 
emerged over the make-up of the committee. Tensions over who would chair the AHLC 
became so acute that at one point the Israelis and Palestinians jointly offered to mediate 
between the US and the EU – a rather striking turn of events. The battle ended with a 
compromise: Norway became the chair.  
 
In choosing the extent to which they will coordinate their programs and policies, donors 
must weigh the benefits of greater coherence against the costs of reduced autonomy.  
(iv) Increasing donor transparency and accountability 
The reforms in donor practices that are suggested above could be facilitated by moves 
toward greater transparency and accountability in decision-making. The credibility of donor 
calls for ‘good governance’ in aid-receiving countries will be strengthened if they practice 
what they preach. Stronger public oversight could encourage the agencies to elevate results 
above disbursements, question ideological presuppositions, and better coordinate their 
activities. Increased transparency and accountability will not guarantee these 
reorientations, but they could help them along.  
 
Priorities and sequencing  
 
Policy coherence requires not only inter-agency coordination but also agreement on 
common goals and priorities. This requires agreement on ends of policy as well as 
harmonization of the means. Policy coherence at this deeper level poses profound 
challenges. 
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Much policy discourse about war-to-peace transitions centers on two policy goals: 
‘security’ and ‘development.’ The relation between the two has attracted a great deal of 
attention in the wake of the September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, DC, 
but the issue has a much longer history. In his memoir The Essence of Security, published 
as he left the helm of U.S. Department of Defense to assume the presidency of the World 
Bank, Robert McNamara (1968, p. 149) argued that development is crucial for security. 
‘In a modernizing society security means development,’ he wrote. ‘Without internal 
development of at least a minimal degree, order and stability are impossible. They are 
impossible because human nature cannot be frustrated indefinitely.’ 
 
Yet a recent operational note on policies in ‘fragile states,’ prepared jointly by the United 
Nations Development Group and World Bank (2005, p. 4), points out that a single-
minded focus on economic development ‘has in cases led to serious shortfalls in funding 
for critical interventions in the political and security spheres, interventions that are 
critical to creating an environment for economic and social programs to deliver benefits 
for the population.’ Moreover, not all development policies are equally supportive of 
security: ‘Well designed economic and social programs can contribute to political 
stabilization; ill-timed or badly targeted programs can undermine it’ (ibid).43
 
By the same token, a single-minded preoccupation with security can undermine 
development. In Afghanistan, as discussed above, fiscally unsustainable security 
expenditures threaten to overwhelm long-term development needs. In Palestine, Brynen 
(2007) depicts the tensions between efforts to short up the PA’s patronage-based political 
order and the need for an economic environment conducive to investment and growth. In 
Cambodia, Smoke and Taliercio (2007) similarly delineate a divergence between a ‘peace 
and security’ approach to public finance, which regards the existing patronage system as 
necessary for political stability, and a ‘developmental’ approach that advocates reform in 
the name of economic growth and poverty reduction.  
 
At first blush, these examples simply pit short-run expediency against longer-run goals. 
But there are deeper contradictions that are grounded in competing visions of both 
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security and development. Is security merely the absence of violent conflict, sometimes 
termed ‘negative peace’? Or is it the absence of social tensions that threaten to precipitate 
conflict, sometimes termed ‘positive peace’? The former often can be achieved, at least 
for a time, by means of repression and intimidation. The latter demands political 
inclusion and shared perceptions of justice. Similar questions can be posed about 
development. Is this defined simply as economic growth? Or to qualify as genuine 
development, must growth be inclusive?  
 
A further source of divergence arises from the differences between the priorities of donor 
governments and those of the people who are on the receiving end of aid. When 
international actors intervene in the name of security, whose security is paramount: the 
‘human security’ of the populace, the ‘national security’ of the government, or the 
‘security interests’ of the donor governments? Similarly, is success of the development 
front to be measured in terms of local livelihoods, or GNP, or benefits to external 
commercial interests?  
 
Once we recognize the divergences among these goals, getting priorities right cannot be 
seen as merely a technical challenge. It is a political challenge, too, posing fundamental 
choices about values and the kind of world in which we want to live. The premise of this 
paper is that in wartorn societies, building a durable peace should be the top priority for 
public policy, the goal around which diverse policies must cohere. 
 
Yet even if there is general agreement on this premise, there is considerable disagreement 
as to the proper sequencing of policies, or what might be termed prioritization amongst 
priorities. These disagreements do not simply reflect the great uncertainties and lack of 
adequate information that characterize post-conflict environments; they also reflect the 
competing interests within donor governments and the prevailing incentive structures 
within aid agencies that have been described above. Three systematic features of donor 
behavior contribute to poor sequencing: 
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(i) Coordination failures: Some sequencing problems result simply from the 
division of labor amongst multiple agencies and the failure to share information 
and coordinate actions. A recent study offers the common-sense recommendation 
that donors should “pay attention to vital prerequisites before launching any 
ambitions reform programs,” noting as an example that “sweeping civil service 
reform and rapid military downsizing can be counterproductive if effective 
compensation and assistance packages are not in place” (Timilsina and Dobbins, 
2007, p. 3). The problems of inter-agency coordination are compounded, 
however, by inter-agency competition and rivalry. A recent review of post-
conflict needs assessments, conducted jointly by the United Nations and the 
World Bank, observes that “the dramatic needs in post-conflict settings generate 
pressure towards a comprehensive rather than a strategic approach,” generating 
over-ambitious plans and unrealistic expectations (United Nations and World 
Bank, 2007, p. 5). The review calls for steps to “re-engineer” the needs 
assessment process “by building in mechanisms, clearly articulated criteria, and 
incentives for ‘real’ prioritization and sequencing” (ibid., p. 12). Yet it recognizes 
that political timing “puts a premium on the assessment generating a costed report 
that carries an impressive ‘price tag’” so as to “harvest significant support from 
donor countries while the ‘CNN effect’ is still active” (ibid., p. 31). The result is a 
scramble to stake claims in the post-conflict aid rush, a dynamic that militates 
against selectivity and sensible sequencing. 
 
(ii) Misplaced priorities: The competing interests of donor governments and the 
ideological biases of aid agencies further compound the problem. An example of 
competing interests is the current policy of putting a high priority on poppy 
eradication in Afghanistan in the name of combating the illicit narcotics trade. As 
Richard Holbrooke (2008) recently wrote, eradication “pushes farmers with no 
other source of livelihood into the arms of the Taliban without reducing the total 
amount of opium being produced.” By putting the eradication cart before the 
security horse, the drug-control policy yields perverse results. An example of 
ideological bias is the over-zealous promotion by international financial 
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institutions of privatization and ‘liberalization’ (e.g., sharp reductions in tariffs), 
which as Timilsina (2006, p. 91) concludes, on the basis of case studies of Haiti, 
Mozambique and Cambodia, “may not be an immediate priority in every post-
conflict country.”  
 
(iii) Myopia: Sequencing problems are also exacerbated by the tendency to let 
short-run demands crowd out long-run needs. This helps to explain the bias 
against local suppliers, illustrated earlier by the example of foreign sourcing of 
school furniture in East Timor. It helps to explain the ‘dual public sector’ 
syndrome, in which the bypassing of the state is rationalized on the basis of short-
run efficiency while neglecting the longer-term tasks of building the capacities 
needed for an effective and legitimate state. It also helps to explain the common 
failure to engage with civil society and enlist broad public participation in 
decision-making, processes that are seen as desirable in theory but too time-
consuming to implement in practice.44  
 
In sum, the obstacles to successful postwar reconstruction and peacebuilding are not only 
located within the wartorn societies themselves. There are also deeply rooted obstacles 
located in the policies and priorities of the international community and the donor 
agencies. In the end, more effective aid for the reconstruction of wartorn societies will 
require the reconstruction of aid itself.
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Notes
                                                 
1 There is ample precedent. For example, in 1990 the U.S. retaliated for Yemen’s vote against a resolution 
authorizing force against Iraq by cutting off aid. See Zeller (2003). 
 
2 It is now widely recognized that other revenue sources (e.g., value-added taxes) seldom succeed in 
replacing lost tariff revenues on a one-for-one basis. See Khattry and Rao (2002) and Baunsgaard and Keen 
(2005). 
 
3 A World Bank study estimates that in the first five years after a peace accord, a country has a 44% chance 
of reverting to war (Collier et al., 2003, p. 83). 
 
4 ‘The neoliberal recommendation to national policy makers is that they should insist on maintaining 
inflation rates of 3-5 per cent,’ writes McKinley (2006, p. 352), ‘even though there is little empirical 
evidence to suggest that inflation rates above that level, or even above 10 per cent, have an adverse effect 
on growth.’ For discussion of alternatives to inflation targeting, based on ‘real-economy’ targets such as 
employment, see Epstein (2003). 
 
5 Personal interview, Phnom Penh, November 1998. 
 
6 ‘Donor Statement’ dated 6 October 1995, cited by Christian Michelsen Institute, Evaluation of Norwegian 
Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique (Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
1997), p. 49.   
 
7 A revised version of Boyce et al. (1995) was published as Boyce, ed., Economic Policy for Building 
Peace. 
 
8 Some observers attributed funding shortfalls to fiscal austerity measures demanded by IMF and World 
Bank conditionalities (see, for example, Orr, 2001, p. 167). A careful analysis of policy formation in the 
early years of the Salvadoran peace process suggests, however, that the core problem was the unwillingness 
of the government to fund these programs, rather than its inability to do so (see Wood, 1996 and Boyce, 
1996). 
 
9 For further discussions of peace conditionality, see Frerks (2006) and Goodhand (2006). 
 
10 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Articles of Agreement, Article III, Section 5(b). 
11 In November 2007, for example, the carrot of EU accession helped persuade Bosnian Serb leaders to 
accept new parliamentary voting rules, resolving “the most serious political crisis since the end of the 1992-
1995 war” (Associated Press, 2007). 
 
12 For discussion, see Pronk (2001) and Boyce (2002b). 
 
13 For an analysis that represents IMF conditionality as an alliance in which the Fund supports a reformist 
government in the face of domestic interest groups opposed to reform, see Drazen (2002). More generally,  
there donors also could ally with like-minded domestic groups outside the government or within a 
heterogeneous government. For further discussion of aid and cross-national coalitions, see Milder (1996). 
   
14 See the UNDPKO/World Bank joint review of GEMAP by Dwan and Bailey (2006, pp. 20-21).  
Referring to the issue of domestic allies, the authors argue that more could have been done to engage with 
civil society in Liberia: ‘While caution in appearing to circumvent national authorities is an important 
consideration, international partners could have done much more to facilitate public debate on economic 
governance as well as to build more informal, off-line strands of support among key actors.’ 
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15 A ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Council endorsed this principle in May 1997, 
recommending that ‘assistance for housing and local infrastructure should be dependent on the acceptance of 
return’ of refugees and displaced persons (Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board 
of the Peace Implementation Council, Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997, paragraph 46). 
 
16 In the case of Rwanda, for example, Obidegwu (2003, p. 20) observes, ‘With the flood of international 
NGOs, relief and development agencies into Rwanda after the genocide, the government service could not 
compete for the few qualified people available.’ In the case of Afghanistan, Ghani et al.  (2005, p. 10) 
contrast the salaries of $1000 per month paid by donor agencies to $50 per month paid by the government, 
and remark: ‘Unsurprisingly, there has been a brain drain from the managerial tier of the government to 
menial positions in the aid system. The people might have judged it to be fair had the disparity in wages 
resulted from a competitive market; however, the problem is that both bureaucracies are funded from the 
resources of the aid system and the rules for remuneration are arrived at by bureaucratic fiat rather than by 
open processes of competition.’ 
 
17  Voicing the last two of these concerns in an analysis of aid to Mozambique, Arndt et al. (2006, p. 1) 
conclude: ‘[T]he proliferation of donors and aid-supported interventions has burdened local administration 
and there is a distinct need to develop government accountability to its own citizens rather than donor 
agencies.’ 
 
18 In USAID’s program for building schools and health clinics in Afghanistan, for example, ‘Employees of 
a Maryland-based nonprofit relief agency hired to monitor construction quality demanded a $50,000 payoff 
from Afghan builders – a scene captured in a clandestine videotape obtained by The Washington Post’ 
(Stephens and Ottaway 2005). 
  
19 In Afghanistan, the former planning minister ‘has become one of the most popular politicians in the 
country by campaigning against NGOs [non-governmental organizations], which he has said are more 
dangerous than al-Qaeda’ (Rubin 2005, p. 101).  
 
20 In exceptional circumstances, dual-control systems can also be applied to domestic revenues (for 
discussion, see Le Billon 2003). An example is the Governance and Economic Management Assistance 
Program (GEMAP) instituted in postwar Liberia in 2005. 
 
21 Gupta et al. (2004) find a negative relationship between government revenue and conflict in a sample of 
low- and middle-income countries. Addison et al. (2004) report that the intensity of conflict, as well as its 
presence, negatively affects the tax/GDP ratio. 
 
22 Examining evidence from a large sample of developing countries, Gupta et al. (2003) find that grant aid, 
in particular, tends to lower revenue efforts; in countries with high levels of corruption, ‘the decline in 
revenues completely offsets the increase in grants.’ A recent IMF study (Heller 2005, pp. 4, 21) cites 
disincentives to mobilize domestic resources as a ‘moral hazard’ of external aid flows, observing that 
‘some African countries with among the highest ratios of aid to GDP are also those that have stubbornly 
low tax ratios.’ 
 
23 Thus at the 1998 meeting of the Consultative Group for Guatemala, the IMF representative urged the 
government to ‘resist pressures to increase import duties or delay the scheduled reduction in customs 
tariffs,’ arguing that ‘these actions will have adverse effects on output growth’ (quoted in Boyce 2002a, p. 
47). 
   
24 Camdessus warned that without a significant increase in the tax effort Guatemala could not expect to 
receive substantial international aid , and noted that the IMF would have preferred an even more ambitious 
revenue target. See Boyce (2002a, pp. 41-42) and Jonas (2000, pp. 185-186). 
 
25 Thus among dozens of examples of EU budget-support conditionality listed in a report by the European 
Commission (2005), the Mozambique case is the sole example of revenue-side conditionality. 
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26 ‘The Afghanistan Compact,’ London Conference on Afghanistan, 31 January – 1 February 2006, p. 12. 
Available at http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_londonConf/_docs/06jan30-AfghanistanCompact-Final.pdf. 
 
27 Under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, UN officials are ‘exempt 
from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the United Nations’ (United Nations 1946, 
sec. 18b). The United States did not sign the Convention (whereas virtually all other member states did so), 
and hence US citizens and permanent residents employed by the UN are liable for US income taxes. To 
redress the resulting disparities, a ‘staff assessment’ is deducted from the nominal gross salaries of UN 
employees and paid into a Tax Equalization Fund. The Fund is used for two purposes: (i) to reimburse 
income-tax payments by US citizens employed by the UN, so that net salaries of UN personnel are 
unaffected by the employee’s US tax status; and (ii) to offset the UN budget dues of the other member 
states that are signatories to the Convention, while the US government receives no offset by virtue of the 
fact that it taxes UN employees. The staff assessment is sometimes characterized as an ‘internal tax’ 
administered by the UN, a description that is misleading in that its purpose is ‘to place United Nations staff 
members subject to taxation [i.e., US citizens and permanent residents] in the position they would have 
been if their official emoluments were not taxed’ (United Nations Secretariat 2007, p. 5). 
 
28 For an example of an assessment, see Goodhand (2001). 
 
29 For an exception, see the data on the provincial distribution of revenue and expenditure in Burundi that 
are presented by Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2005). 
 
30 For further discussion of the ‘dark side’ of social capital, see also Putzel (1997), Ostrom (1999), and 
Field (2003, ch. 3). 
 
31 The two can go together. In the war in Bosnia, the destruction of the magnificent medieval bridge 
between east and west Mostar came to symbolize the breakdown of trust between Muslim Bosniaks and 
Catholic Bosnian Croats. 
 
32 For a discussion of ‘spoilers,’ including the distinction between ‘limited’ and ‘greedy’ spoilers who are 
responsive to changing incentives and ‘total spoilers’ who are not, see Stedman (1997, 2002).  
 
33 For discussion, see Boyce (2002a). 
 
34 For a review of the rather sparse literature on the distributional impacts of taxation in developing 
countries, see Gemmell and Morrissey (2005). 
 
35 This figure excludes counter-narcotics expenditures, which would push the ratio closer to 600%. 
 
36 The supposed efficiency advantages of foreign sourcing can be illusory. In Afghanistan, for example, 
where USAID funds for rebuilding schools and health clinics were routed through a New Jersey-based 
private contractor, press reports have revealed inordinate delays, shoddy construction, and ‘extraordinary 
costs’ in the words of a USAID official (Stephens and Ottaway 2005; see also Rohde and Gall 2005). 
 
37 In the end, some of the school furniture was procured locally, albeit with delays. For discussion of the 
scope for greater local procurement in postconflict operations, see Carnahan , Gilmore and Rahman (2005) 
 
38 Interview with a United Nations human rights official, Phnom Penh, November 1998. 
 
39  For discussions of Chinese aid to Africa, see Davies (2007), McGreal (2007), Zafar (2007), and Huse 
and Muyakwa (2008). Similar issues have arisen in Cambodia, where Chinese aid in 2006 undermined an 
initiative by other donors to attach anti-corruption conditions to a new aid package (Hauter 2007). For 
recent signs of shifts in Chinese policy, see Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small (2008). 
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40 Personal interview with a senior international official who participated in these meetings, Gaza City, 
March 1998. 
 
41 In addition to coordination across different donor governments, there are often serious coordination 
problems among the various agencies of any single donor government; see, for discussion, Patrick and 
Brown (2007). 
 
42  The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Annex 10, Article II, Sections 
1(a) and 1(c). 
43 In a similar vein, Smith (2004, p. 44) warns: ‘It is, unfortunately, likely that where development 
cooperation is the default conceptual and planning mode, the specifics of peacebuilding – the war-defined 
context – will slip out of focus. The results of that could be serious.’ 
 
44 Underscoring this point, a recent critique of security sector reform programs concluded, “As difficult or 
seemingly counterproductive as it may seem in the short-term, participatory reform processes involving a 
broad range of local actors with a stake in security governance are critical in order to embed reform in 
wider social structures” (Bryden, Donais and Hanggi, 2005, p. 29). 
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